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Abstract. Distance-bounding is a practical solution to be used in security-sensitive contexts, mainly to pre-
vent relay attacks. But subtle security shortcomings related to the PRF (pseudorandom function) assumption
and ingenious attack techniques based on observing verifiers’ outputs have recently been put forward. In this
extended abstract, we survey some of these security concerns and attempt to incorporate the lessons taught by
these new developments in ideas of distance-bounding protocol design.
1 Introduction
In [4], Brands and Chaum introduced the notion of distance-bounding (DB) protocols. The aim is to
have a prover demonstrate his proximity to a verifier, and authenticate himself to this verifier. The
proof of proximity can be an efficient deterrent against relay attacks [9]. DB protocols [11,12,14,15]
generally consist of an initialisation phase (where the parties establish some short-term secret) and
a distance-bounding (DB) phase. This latter phase is time-critical. It imposes very fast computation,
typically of less than a single clock cycle per round, and the verifier measures the time-of-flight of the
messages exchanged. This is how the verifier ascertains a distance-bound between him and the prover.
Most distance-bounding protocols follow the following design pattern, where f is a PRF and F is a
response-function for the DB phase.
Verifier V Prover P
shared secret x shared secret x
Initialisation phase
messagesV−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→
messagesP←−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
a := fx(messagesP,messagesV )
Distance-bounding phase
for i = 1 to n
Start Clock ci−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→
ri := F(ci,ai,xi)
Stop Clock ri←−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
Fig. 1. The General Structure of Numerous DB Protocols (see [15,14])
In the literature covering such protocols, the threat-model comprises three well-established types
of attacks. The first is distance-fraud (DF), in which a prover tries to convince the verifier that he is
closer than he really is. In the second type, mafia-fraud (MF), an adversary communicates with both
a prover and a verifier which are far apart, and the adversary tries to convince the verifier that the
prover would be close enough to be granted privileges. Finally, in a terrorist-fraud (TF), an adversary
is getting the necessary and sufficient help from a coerced, far-away prover in order to pass the protocol
only during this corrupted run, but not in a later, coercion-free session. Generalisations of these frauds
have also been imagined. In [8], Cremers et al. describe distance-hijacking as a mixture between
distance-fraud and terrorist-fraud: one dishonest, far-away prover exploits several honest provers to
gain privileges. Impersonation-fraud is presented in [10]; as its name suggests, one dishonest prover
tries to impersonate an honest one.
In this extended abstract, we first survey the most recent such attacks that have been proposed.
Then, we attempt to incorporate the lessons taught by these new developments in ideas of secure
distance-bounding protocol design.
2 DB: Instability of Security Results
2.1 PRF-based Unfortunate Arguments
Some security models [10] contain incorrect proofs/arguments: i.e., they replace a PRF by a random
function at a place where the adversary has access to the PRF key or at a place where the PRF key is
simultaneously used at other places in the protocol. If we observe Fig. 1, we can see that a dishonest
prover holds the key x of the PRF instance, which is also used inside the call to the response-function
F . So, in a distance-fraud resistance proof, we cannot simply call the PRF assumption when speaking
about the “leakage” produced via using f .
Verifier V Prover P
shared key s ∈ Gm shared key s ∈ Gm
Initialisation phase
NV ←{0,1}m NP←−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−− NP←{0,1}m
NV−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→
For j = 1, . . . ,m For j = 1, . . . ,m
For i = 1, . . . ,n For j = 1, . . . ,m
compute ri, j based on fs(NP,NV ) compute ri, j based on fs(NP,NV )
Distance-bounding phase
for i = 1 to m
Pick ci ∈ [1,n]
Start Clock
ci−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→
rci ,i←−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
Stop Clock
verify the responses and
that ∆ti ≤ 2∆tmax
OutV (...)−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→
Fig. 2. The TDB [1] Protocol
Indeed, in [3], the authors have recently shown that if pseudorandom functions existed, then trapdoor
PRFs can be constructed such that if used in instances of numerous DB protocols, they would lead to
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DF attacks and generalised MF attacks. We leave the reader to consult [3] for the technicalities of the
general construction of such programmed PRFs. In here, we only recall how one such PRF can bring
DF-insecurity if used inside an instance of the TDB [1] protocol.
In Figure 2, we first recall the TDB protocol:
Now, consider one suggested instance of the TDB protocol, i.e., one where n = k = 3, G = F2 and
the 3×m response-matrix is of the form: R1 =
 r1,1 · · · r1,mr2,1 . . . r2,m
s1⊕ r1,1⊕ r2,1 · · · sm⊕ r1,m⊕ r2,m

Then, assuming that PRFs exist, [3] shows that the PRF assumption on f is not enough to protect
against DF in the above TDB instance. Namely, if PRFs exist, then let g be a PRF from {0,1}2m to
itself. Take the PRF f as follows:
fs(NP,NV ) =
{
s‖s, if NP = s
gs(NP,NV ), otherwise.
According to the general construction in [3], if g is a PRF, then this programmed f is a PRF as well.
Then, let P∗ be a dishonest prover who chooses NP=s. In this case, the TDB instance above implies
that the R1 response-matrix has all its rows equal to s. Then, for all challenges ci, the response will be
the i-th bit of the secret key s, hence P∗ can win in a DF by sending the responses before the challenges
even arrive at him.
With similar constructions (all based on their general design of trapdoor PRFs), [3] shows a series
of attacks on numerous DB protocols and implies that possibly other similar DB protocols could be
defeated similarly. A summary of the results in [3] is stated in Table 1.
protocol distance fraud man-in-the-middle attack
TDB Avoine-Lauradoux-Martin
[ACM WiSec 2011]
√ √
Dürholz-Fischlin-Kasper-Onete [ISC
2011]
√
–
Hancke-Kuhn [Securecomm 2005]
√
–
Avoine-Tchamkerten [ISC 2009]
√
–
Reid-Nieto-Tang-Senadji [ASIACCS
2007]
√ √
Swiss-Knife Kim-Avoine-Koeune-
Standaert-Pereira [ICISC 2008]
–
√
Table 1. A Summary of the PRF-based DB Attacks in [3]
2.2 PKC is not the solution for DB!
In some sense, in [2], the authors have recently shown that techniques from public key cryptography
(PKC), i.e., commitments, proofs of knowledge, etc, are not the key to strengthen DB. More concretely,
the authors have shown that the Bussard-Bagga protocols [6,7] suffer from TF attacks, even if their
PKC techniques were supposed to prevent that.
In Figure 3, we first recall the generic Bussard-Bagga protocol, denoted DBPK. In their protocol,
the prover P has a secret key x and a published certificate on its public key y= Γ(x). In the initialization
phase, the prover generates a random secret session key k ∈R {0,1}m and uses this session key in
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order to encrypt his private key x. The encryption of x is done under a symmetric key encryption
scheme E : {0,1}m×{0,1}m→{0,1}m. After encrypting x and computing e, the prover P uses a bit
commitment scheme to commit to each bit of k and e using randomnesses v and v′ respectively.
In each distance-bounding round, the verifier V selects a random bit as the challenge ci and the
prover responds with a response ri such that
ri :=
{
ki, i f ci = 0,
ei, i f ci = 1.
In the commitments’ opening phase, the prover P opens some commitments on the bits of k and
e corresponding to his answers in the distance-bounding phase. This is denoted in Figure 3 through
sending the value γi which stands for the respective randomness used at the commitment phase. In case
that the openings of zk,i and ze,i do not pass, the verifier V sends an error notification message to the
prover P.
In the Proof of knowledge phase, the prover P convinces the verifier V with a zero-knowledge
interaction that he has generated the commitments which correspond to a unique private key x and this
private key corresponds to the public key y that is used by the verifier to authenticate the prover. The
proof of knowledge is denoted as
PK[(α,β) : z =Ω(α,β)∧ y = Γ(α)],
where the knowledge of α,β is being proven, while z,y are as per the protocol, known to the verifier. In
the protocol, we have y = Γ(x) and z =Ω(x,(v,v′)). The value of z can be computed from the zk,i and
ze,i.
The number m of DB rounds and the size m of the key is dictated by a security parameter. Typically,
m varies between 128 and 1024.
Commitments and the Proof of Knowledge in DBPK-Log. The only instances of DBPK providing
concrete commitments and proofs of knowledge are based on the discrete logarithm in Z∗p and are
called DBPK-Log. We now describe these commitments and proofs of knowledge.
We use a strong prime p, two generators g,h of Z∗p, an element x of Z∗p−1, and y = gx mod p.3
We have commit(b,v) = gbhv mod p. The main property of this commitment is that given all zk,i,
ze,i, vi, v′i, we can form z =∏i(zk,ize,i)2
i−1
, v = ∑i(vi+ v′i)2i−1, and obtain that
z = commit((k+ e) mod (p−1),v).
The proposed encryption methods use e = (ux− k) mod (p−1) with either u = 1 [7] or u random and
publicly revealed [7,6]. So, the proof of knowledge consists of proving knowledge of x and v such that
y = gx and z = guxhv in Zp.
The proof of knowledge [6] is repeating t times what follows: the prover sends w1 = guρ1hρ2 mod p
for some random ρ1,ρ2 ∈ Zp−1; the verifier sends some challenge c ∈ {0,1}; the prover responds by
s1 = ρ1−cx mod (p−1) and x2 = ρ2−cv mod (p−1); the verifier checks w1 = zcgus1hs2 mod p and
w2 = ycgs1 mod p.
Terrorist Fraud and Distance Fraud against DBPK-Log We now summarise how, in [2], the authors
show that the above public-key techniques are ineffective in defeating terrorist-fraud. For this, we
consider a malicious prover who is far away from an honest verifier. There is an adversary close to the
verifier who will get some help from the prover to pass the protocol without getting any advantage to
further impersonate the prover. The attack is sketched in Fig. 4.
3 In [6,7,5], h is not necessarily a generator and x ∈ Zp−1\{q} with q = p−12 .
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Verifier V Prover P
public key y = Γ(x) private key x
Initialization phase
session key k←{0,1}m
e = Ek(x) ∈ {0,1}∗
v,v′← ({0,1}∗)m
for i = 1 to m
zk,i = commit(ki,vi)
ze,i = commit(ei,v′i)
endfor
zk := (zk,i)i∈{1,...,m}
ze := (ze,i)i∈{1,...,m}
zk,ze←−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
Distance-bounding phase
for i = 1 to m
Pick ci ∈U {0,1}
Start Clock
ci−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→
ri :=
{
ki, i f ci = 0
ei, i f ci = 1
ri←−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
Stop Clock
Commitment opening phase
for i = 1 to m
γi :=
{
vi, i f ci = 0
v′i, i f ci = 1
γi←−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
verify the responses
zk,i
?
= commit(ki,γi), if ci = 0
ze,i
?
= commit(ei,γi), if ci = 1
Proof of knowledge phase
PK[(α,β):z=Ω(α,β)∧y=Γ(α)]←−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→
Fig. 3. The DBPK Protocol proposed by Bussard and Bagga [6,7,5]
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Verifier V Adversary A Prover P
Initialization phase
z←−−−− z = guxhv mod p
A guesses the future value c1 and compute the commitments:
set zk,i := commit(ki,vi), ze,i := commit(ei,v′i) for all i > 1
set zk,1 := commit(k1,vi) if c1 = 0 (ze,1 is a free variable)
set ze,1 := commit(e1,v′i) if c1 = 1 (zk,1 is a free variable)
solve z =∏i(zk,ize,i)2
i−1
in the remaining free variable
for i = 1 to m
z :=∏i(zk,ize,i)2
i−1 zk,i,ze,i←−−−−
Distance-bounding phase
for i = 1 to m
ci−−−−→if i = 1 and c1 incorrect, abort
ri←−−−− ri :=
{
ki if ci = 0
ei if ci = 1
Commitment opening phase
for i = 1 to m
γi←−−−− γi :=
{
vi if ci = 0
v′i if ci = 1
Proof of knowledge phase
verify z PoK←−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→ prove x,v for z
Fig. 4. Terrorist Fraud against DBPK-Log
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First, the malicious prover selects u and v ∈ Zp−1 (with either u = 1 or a random u, as specified
in DBPK-Log), then computes z = guxhv mod p and sends z to the adversary. The adversary selects
some random ki, ei, vi, v′i, i = 1, . . . ,m, and a random bit c1. Then, he computes zk,i = commit(ki,vi)
and ze,i = commit(ei,v′i) for i = 2, . . . ,m. If c1 = 0, he sets zk,1 = commit(k1,v1) and ze,1 remains
free. If c1 = 1, he sets ze,1 = commit(e1,v′1) and zk,1 remains free. Then, he can solve the equation
z = ∏i(zk,ize,i)2
i−1
mod p in the remaining free variable. Next, the adversary runs the DBPK-Log
initialization phase, distance-bounding phase, and opening phase using these values. Note that if the
value of the challenge c1 received from the verifier differs from the value of the bit c1 which were
selected, the attack aborts.4 Otherwise, it is straightforward to see that the adversary can answer all
challenges and open all commitments. Then, the verifier will compute z which matches the one selected
by the malicious prover. Finally, the adversary relays the proof of knowledge for x and v (such that
z = guxhv mod p).
Clearly, this attack succeeds with probability 12 (or even 1 if the verifier allows an error in the first
round). It is also clear that since the proof-of-knowledge is zero-knowledge and that x is not used
anywhere else, that the adversary learns no information about x. So, it is a valid terrorist-fraud.
In fact, it is easy to see that the attack above can be transformed into a DF as well. This is also
exhibited in [2].
In fact, [2] further proposes a series of attacks on follow-ups of the Bussard-Bagga protocols, this
time protocols based only on symmetric key techniques. The authors of [2] notice that the information
leaked from the combination of the protocol with the answers on the verifier’s return channel can be
exploited by a man-in-the-middle attacker to mount generalised mafia-fraud attacks.
We conclude this section by saying that recently alarming shortcomings of the security claims on
DB have been published. Thus, we call for provable security of DB. In the following section, we are
going to give some directive lines towards that, drawn from the lessons taught by the attacks above.
3 Towards Provably Secure DB
3.1 PRF Masking
First recall the general schema of DB in Fig.1. Also, remember that in the DF attack presented in
Section 2.1, a dishonest prover was adaptively choosing a nonce NP to influence the distribution of the
output of the PRF instance fx(. . . ,NP) and eventually mount a DF attack. To avoid such situations, we
propose enhancing the DB protocols with a technique that we call PRF masking:
— instead of fx(. . .) being identically calculated on messagesP,messagesV on P’s and V ’s sides, a
bitstring a is chosen by the verifier and sent encrypted using the PRF instance fx, i.e.,
[M = a⊕ fx(messagesP,messagesV )] is s sent by V to P.
3.2 Circular Keying Security
The MiM attacks presented in [3], attacks that follow the idea in Section 2.1, are possible due to the use
of the key x both in the PRF instance and in the response-function F . This is not how PRF instances are
normally used, when invoked for their security properties, i.e., for their random-like outputs. Therefore,
we would like to amend the shortfalls presented in [3] by requiring that the PRF instances used inside
DB protocols are such that their underlying key can be re-used outside of the function in some linear
fashion, without this causing a key leakage. More precisely, we would require that a PRF f is circular
4 The attack could also go on with the adversary taking c1 as the value he selected, and counting on that the verifier will
accept this error as due to noise.
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keying secure :
— if A makes a query (yi,ai,bi), the oracle answers (ai · x′)+(bi · fx(yi)) and A cannot distinguish if
x = x′ or x and x′ are independent.
There is small caveat to this requirement, namely that for all c1, . . . ,cq such that c1b1+ · · ·+cqbq = 0,
we must have c1a1+ · · ·+ cqaq = 0.
3.3 A Secure DB Attempt
Summing up the above requirements, we conjecture that a protocol of the following kind would resist
the new attacks in [3].
Verifier Prover
secret: x secret: x
initialization phase
NP←−−−−−−−−−− pick NP
pick M,NV
M,NV−−−−−−−−−−→
a1‖a2 = M⊕ fx(NP,NV ) a1‖a2 = M⊕ fx(NP,NV )
distance bounding phase
for i = 1 to n
pick ci ∈ {1,2,3}
start clock ci−−−−−−−−−−→
stop clock ri←−−−−−−−−−− ri =

a1,i if ci = 1
a2,i if ci = 2
xi⊕a1,i⊕a2,i if ci = 3
check τ responses
check timers
OutV−−−−−−−−−−→
NOTE: f is a circular-keying secure PRF and it has many possible variants
Fig. 5. A Protocol Directing Towards Provably Secure DB
4 Conclusions
With the above protocol in mind and with the recent threats summarised herein, we conclude that
best-known attacks or security claims on DB are not enough. DB protocols will soon be implemented
by car manufacturers or bank payment companies in their products, as platforms for such deployments
arise [13]. Thus, what we would need now is solid communication/threat models, clear design and
more than anything else reliable security proofs in these models. We launch therefore a call for this.
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